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FLORINA CRISTIANA MATEI
The Media’s Role in Intelligence
Democratization
Freedom of media: ‘‘once in place, it is an extraordinarily powerful
catalyst for other democratic reforms.’’1
In their path toward democratic consolidation, emerging democracies
endeavor to ensure the democratic transfer of political power, bring
changes in the legal framework, transform their executive, legislative, and
judicial systems, boost free market economy, and develop robust and
functional civil societies. They also institutionalize democratic civil–military
relations (CMR) by establishing new security institutions—military, police,
and intelligence agencies—that are under democratic civilian control,
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effective, and efficient. Of these many tasks, the democratization of
intelligence agencies is by far the most daunting, as effectiveness and
efficiency involve secrecy, while democratic control implies transparency,
openness, and accountability. Nevertheless, democratic reform of
intelligence in new democracies, though difficult, is not impossible, if and
when civilians are interested and willing to ‘‘invest’’ in intelligence and
intelligence reform. The contribution of external factors, such as media,2
civil society, international groups, and individuals involved in human
rights, may also be instrumental in achieving a balance between control
and effectiveness of intelligence (see Table 1).
RELEVANCE
The academic, professional, and journalistic literature on intelligence in
developed democracies is abundant, with many competent studies on
intelligence in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel, including
articles and books on the role of the media in intelligence reform. In
addition, the literature on intelligence in developing democracies is
growing: respectable journals such as the International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Intelligence and National Security,
Studies in Intelligence, Democratization; regional and international
institutions including the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces (DCAF), the RAND Corporation, and the Center for
Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), to name a few that have contributed a
wide range of valuable resources on the topic,3 while virtual libraries and
data bases, such as those of the Federation of American Scientists
(www.fas.org) have become excellent sources of information on intelligence
in new democracies.
Most of the literature on intelligence in the newer democracies focuses on
how to achieve control and transparency, which is very important
considering the role and place of intelligence services in past non-democratic
regimes, rather than on achieving intelligence effectiveness, which, in the age
of information, terrorism, and organized crime, is equally important. Yet,
only limited research has been done with regard to the media’s role in
intelligence reform in new democracies, particularly in regard to its
effectiveness.
DEMOCRATIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE AS A SUBSET OF
CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS
In previous works, Professor Thomas Bruneau and I proposed a framework
that we believe better captures the priorities and requirements of both
democratic consolidation and contemporary security challenges. It consists
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of a trinity: (1) democratic civilian control of the security forces—military,
police, intelligence; (2) the effectiveness of the security forces in fulfilling
their assigned roles;4 and (3) their efficiency, that is, fulfilling the assigned
roles and missions at a minimum cost. Democratic reform of intelligence
can be analyzed with this framework.5
Democratic civilian control (DCC) is conceptualized in terms of authority
over the following: institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the
inculcation of professional norms, although these norms can also
contribute to effectiveness. Institutional control mechanisms involve
providing direction and guidance for the security forces, exercised through
institutions that range from organic laws and other regulations that
empower the civilian leadership to civilian-led organizations with
professional staffs. The latter can include a ministry of defense for the
military, a ministry of the interior for the national police, and a civilian-led
intelligence agency; one or more committees in the legislature that deal
with policies and budgets; and, a well-defined chain of authority for
civilians to determine roles and missions, such as a National Security
Council-type organization. Oversight is exercised on a regular legal basis
by the civilian leadership to keep track of what the security forces do, and
to ensure they are in fact following the direction and guidance they have
received from the civilian chain of command. In a functioning democracy,
oversight is exercised not only by formal agencies within the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches, but also by the independent media,
NGOs, think tanks, and even international organizations, such as human
rights courts. Professional norms are institutionalized through legally
approved and transparent policies for recruitment, education, training, and
promotion, in accordance with the goals of the democratically elected
civilian leadership, thus internalizing the previous two control mechanisms.
Effectiveness in fulfilling roles and missions involves three necessary, yet
not necessarily sufficient, requirements. First, a plan must be in place,
which may take the form of a strategy or even a doctrine. Examples
include national security strategies, national military strategies, white
papers on security and defense, strategies for disaster relief, strategies on
organized crime, doctrines on intelligence, counterterrorism doctrines, and
the like. Second, structures and processes are required to both formulate
the plans and implement them. These include ministries of defense and
interior, national security councils, or other means that facilitate jointness
or interagency coordination, as well as international cooperation. Third, a
country must commit resources, in the form of political capital, money,
and personnel, to ensure that it has sufficient equipment, trained forces,
and other assets needed to implement the assigned roles and missions.
Lacking any one of the three components casts doubt on how any state
could effectively implement any of these roles and missions.6
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Of multiple definitions and conceptualizations of democratic consolidation
(COD),7 the conceptualization provided by scholars Juan Linz and Alfred
Stepan highlights the relevance of civil society in the COD process. They
equate democratic consolidation with the existence of five complementary
and interacting arenas operating within a functioning state: (1) a free and
lively civil society (which includes media), where citizens, groups, and,
movements, generally autonomous from the state, associate to convey
shared ideas, concepts, interests, and values; (2) a relatively autonomous
and valued political society, whereby the polity arranges itself to dispute
the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state
apparatus, and which includes political parties, elections, electoral rules,
political leadership, interparty alliances, and legislatures; (3) a rule of law
(ROL) arena, namely a spirit of constitutionalism and a clear hierarchy of
laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a
strong legal culture in the civil society, to ensure legal guarantees for
citizens’ freedoms and independent association life; (4) a functioning state
bureaucracy whereby the democratically elected government utilizes its
claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory (to
command, regulate, extract) effectively, and to enforce the law in order to
protect citizens rights and deliver other goods; and (5) an institutionalized
economic society, whereby socio-politically crafted and socio-politically
agreed-upon norms, institutions, and regulations exist to mediate between
state and market.8
Notably, the first arena they list is the ‘‘free and lively civil society,’’ whose
role is to provide a check on state power: ‘‘A robust civil society, with the
capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and
state can help transitions get started, help resist reversal, help push
transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen
democracy. At all stages of the democratization process, therefore, a lively
and independent civil society is invaluable.’’9 Another author, Judith
Lichtenberg, has put it succinctly: ‘‘Freedom of the press has been thought
a necessary safeguard in a democratic society’’; while free media and
unhindered and unbiased journalism are, according to Julianne Schultz,
the ‘‘handmaiden of democracy.’’10 As the Canadian scholar and
democratic control of armed forces (DCAF) expert Marina Caparini
explains, ‘‘Democracy is strengthened and its integrity ensured by the free
flow of information and competition among public and commercial media
articulating (often under force of law) a variety of political viewpoints to
educate the public and allow it to make informed choices . . . .’’11 Sanford J.
Ungar has stressed ‘‘the fundamental role of a free press in sustaining
democracies everywhere, and in helping to build them where they do not
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exist. This role transcends national borders, ideological fashions, and
short-term changes in political climate.’’12
MEDIA AND INTELLIGENCE DEMOCRATIZATION: POTENTIAL ROLES
Democracies, virtually all agree, require ‘‘opposition parties and a civil
society, and . . . independent news media.’’13 In this context, can media play
a part in the democratization of intelligence in new democracies? If yes, how?
By examining the media’s behavior in some new democracies, at least five
media roles can be identified in the context of democratic reform of
intelligence: informing the public; liaising government with the citizens;
helping boost government legitimacy; exercising informal external oversight
of the government; and providing a ‘‘learning’’ environment for elected
officials and the public.
Informing the Public
Various elements of the media inform the citizenry and help shape public
opinion. Few citizens have the time and resources to do their own research
on politics and government policies, including elections and electoral
campaigns, domestic and foreign policies, national security, and international
developments. They rely on the media to acquire information, knowledge,
and form ideas. As American academic and former intelligence professional
Kenneth Dombroski put it,
The publication or broadcast of policies and events through the news
media, whether these policies are related to national security or the
price of corn, is the only way that most people can become informed in
a timely manner about issues that may impact their lives. Without a
free press printing what is of interest to the public, the average citizen
would be at a greater disadvantage versus the privileged . . . .14
The media observe, report, and channel important political and security
information to the public, and help the public interpret said information
and form opinions, thus fostering citizens’ participation in political life.
With regard to intelligence, the media inform citizens on national security
issues—from threats and challenges to national security, to current
government policies pertaining to national security, roles and missions of
security institutions (intelligence, police, military) in averting and
combating national security threats, including the need for a certain level
of secrecy. Any progress and=or potential flaws in state institutions’
response to national security issues, as well as necessary reforms, are also
often reported and monitored by the media.
In Romania, since the end of the Communist regime in 1989, newspapers,
as well as several radio stations and television channels, have sporadically
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brought to public debate issues regarding national security, the
democratization of the security institutions, along with other aspects and
challenges to intelligence and national security. Radu Tudor (Romania’s
correspondent for the British media outlet Jane’s), Doru Dragomir, Sabina
Fatti, and Bogdan Chireac are but a few of the journalists who have been
informing public opinion domestically and abroad on defense, security,
intelligence issues and developments, the status of intelligence reform,
abuses, wrongdoing, and policies. Likewise, in Peru, after the fall of the
Fujimori regime in 2000, the media disclosed cases of illegal wiretapping
and the lack of progress in democratic reform of intelligence.15 In
Argentina, after two successful terrorist attacks (in 1992 and 1994) which
cast doubt on the effectiveness of the country’s intelligence agencies, the
media informed the public about the observations and recommendations of
the Joint Committee for the Oversight of Internal Security and Intelligence
Activities and Agencies to the Executive.16 In South Korea, the media’s
coverage and criticism of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) exposed
issues pertaining to the service’s lack of accountability and effectiveness, as
well as with ethical problems, wrongdoing, and corruption scandals.17 In
Mongolia, ‘‘according to public opinion polls conducted in 2009, 28.3
percent identified the newspapers as a main source of information about
intelligence activities, whereas an additional 35.4 percent identified
television and radio.’’18
In addition, media can inform about issues that were previously not a topic
of public debate, or they might bring new interpretations, opinions, and
arguments to an existing story.19 Indeed, the international, then domestic,
media—not intelligence agencies or control mechanisms—let the U.S. and
Romanian publics know about rendition and black sites in Europe. In
Spain, media exposure of intelligence wrongdoing and scandals in the
1990s let the citizens know for the first time about the existence of
intelligence agencies. As scholar Antonio Diaz Fernandez notes: ‘‘After
years in which the Intelligence Services were inexistent for the citizens, they
suddenly were surprised with the outbreak of a new period where the
Spaniards daily had breakfast with new revelations on the undercover
activities of the Intelligence Services.’’20
Liaising Government with Citizens
Besides conveying information, the media act as a virtual forum, where
citizens ‘‘meet’’ and ‘‘interact’’ with their government. Essentially, the
media constitute a ‘‘public sphere,’’ ‘‘an institutional framework, and set of
practices which encourage wide and inclusive public debate about issues of
social and political importance,’’ a ‘‘mobilizing’’ element which provides
‘‘incentives to citizens to become more informed and involved.’’21 With
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regard to intelligence, the media, and other components of civil society are
channels that facilitate the transmission of ‘‘pulses’’ of transparency from a
space of secrecy. ‘‘Media’’ constitutes a milieu of debate, dialogue, liaison,
and networking among policymakers, security institutions, and the
citizenry. Virtually, through debates and dialogue, the media can shape
both public and government agendas. Indeed, as Marina Caparini
maintained, ‘‘media in a democratic society have a responsibility for
‘keeping the democratic conversation going’ and keeping society open to a
diversity of ideas, but it shares this responsibility with other figures such as
politicians . . . and citizens.’’22
Through the media, government institutions and elected officials
communicate their interests, viewpoints, priorities, intentions, concerns,
strategies, and policies to the public. As British scholars Peter Gill and
Mark Phythian have noted, ‘‘Agencies . . .now make some of their analyses
directly available to the public; by definition, . . . unclassified, and . . . likely
to be in the category of basic intelligence, but they are a welcome element
of the more general democratization of intelligence in recent decades.’’23
For example, immediately after taking office as Director of the Czech
Republic Security and Intelligence Service (BIS), Jiri Ruzek (1999–2003),
revealed that his first priorities ‘‘would be to stabilize the BIS and improve
the security clearance process,’’ which according to Canadian scholar
Ste´phane Lefebvre, he did.24 In Romania, Director George Christian
Maior announced the Intelligence Service’s (SRI) two ‘‘Strategic Vision’’
reforms via the Internet, newspapers, television, and radio channels. Along
with the directors of the Foreign Intelligence Service (Serviciul de
Informatii Externe—SIE) and the General Directorate for Defense
Intelligence (Directia de Informatii a Aparaii—DGIA), Dr. Maior has
frequently participated in talk shows and given press briefings on security
threats, and the role of intelligence in policy versus politicization of
intelligence. In Brazil, in 2005, the Agencia Brasileira de Intelligencia
(ABIN) invited media to its first conference on Intelligence and
Democracy, whereby they conveyed their and international participants’
information regarding the need for intelligence in a democratic system, and
how to balance the need for transparency with the need for effectiveness.
In 2013, Portugal organized a course and invited the public and media
representatives to discuss the challenges of intelligence reform in a
democracy and help develop an ‘‘intelligence culture.’’25
Media is also the place for leaking information that might not have been
considered by official control and oversight mechanisms to be releasable,
or when citizens in possession of (classified) intelligence information could
not approach formal control and oversight institutions and instead
contacted journalists.26 In the Czech Republic, for instance, in 1999,
shortly before the dismissal of BIS Director Karel Vulterin (1997–1999)
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due to government dissatisfaction with the security service and allegations of
illegality (i.e., failing to give prior notice the government on a potential threat
and of the recruitment of an Iraqi operative), BIS officers leaked to the media
classified information on a British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officer,
listed as an advisor at the British Embassy.27 And, in Brazil, in 1998,
information was leaked to the media on the Satiagraha Operation, a
Federal Police intelligence operation investigating corruption, money
laundering, and other crimes, which involved illegal wiretapping by the
Police Intelligence and ABIN of politicians, ministers, bankers, public
servants, lawyers, and judges.28 In Spain, in 1995, Juan Alberto Perote, the
head of the Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa’s (CESID)
Operations Group, leaked 1200 documents from the intelligence service
(also known as the Caso Perote), which revealed illegal wiretapping by the
intelligence services of politicians, journalists, and other public figures,
including King Juan Carlos.29
Opposition parties may also use the media to raise citizens’ interest in a
particular topic or to signal government misbehavior.30 Spain, for example,
has a highly politicized press: According to Richard Schweid, ‘‘Television,
radio, and newspapers at national, regional, and local levels are generally
aligned with a political party, and this is frequently reflected in their news
content, as well as on their editorial pages.’’31 In Romania, the opposition
used the media to ‘‘advertise’’ its planned impeachment of President
Traian Basescu in both 2007 and 2013.32
Further, media is collectively the place where the public, either directly
interacting with the political class or not, reacts to and debates political
issues, and government matters, actions, and inactions, and compares its
own attitudes and opinions with those of others’. For example, with regard
to intelligence, citizens use blogs, journal comments, radio and TV
question and answer (Q&A) sessions to inquire about, comment on,
discuss, debate, criticize, or favor intelligence issues and developments.
Since democratic governments claim that the people are the nation, their
individual and collective interests actually equate to the national interest
and national security. Therefore, their voices should be heard, and the
media is the place to do so. For example, in 2010–2012, in Indonesia,
media was the forum of heated debate on whether or not the bill on
Intelligence to allow the Badan Intelijen Negara=State Intelligence Agency
(BIN) to arrest people should pass. On the same note, in South Africa, in
the 2000s, the Protection of Information Bill was amply debated in the
Ministry for Intelligence Services, the Cabinet, and Parliament, as well as
in the public arena and media.33 Likewise, when Romania’s intelligence
agencies in 2003 revealed their intentions to establish a ‘‘partnership’’ with
the civil society to boost intelligence transparency and effectiveness, many
citizens reacted in the media via newspapers’ comment sections, calling
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radio stations and television channels, and=or creating their own blogs. In
Chile, a notable debate took place among the armed forces, civilian
leadership, civil society, and the media on civil–military relations issues, as
well as on strategic documents in the early 1990s.34 In Argentina, since
1984, debates have been conducted in the mass media on intelligence roles
and missions, legal framework, abuses and ethical issues, and similar
matters.35 In Mongolia, since the regime change in 1992, sporadic debates
in the media on cases of politicization of intelligence have ‘‘caused public
sensitivity and aroused suspicions about the intelligence services’
involvement in domestic politics,’’ and led to reforms in the legal
framework and personnel.36 In Peru, media and public opinion have
debated issues pertaining to the ‘‘proliferation private intelligence
companies, hiring retired military officers, performing illegal espionage
activities, getting involved in turf wars, and making use of information
available from the services’’ otherwise absent in the legal framework.37
Finally, media is the place where government officials and politicians learn
what the public opinion is vis-a`-vis their behavior, beliefs, and policies,
thereby helping them decide whether to either halt or further the debate.
For example, public opinion in South Africa rejected the Protection of
Information Bill, labeling it a ‘‘sinister proposal, the enemy of democracy
and a blatant attempt to gag the media.’’38 Romania’s intelligence agencies
did not give up on the idea of public relations (PR) and partnership, which
has admittedly boosted the development of an intelligence and security
culture in that country, at least as compared to other new democracies,
with debates on intelligence and democracy constantly taking place.
Helping Boost Government Legitimacy
Media may also play a role in strengthening government legitimacy. Through
the media intelligence agencies can garner trust and support from elites and
the general public even if working in secrecy. As scholar Claudia Hillebrand
contends: ‘‘By informing the public about the work of intelligence services
and related policies, they help legitimize the intelligence services.’’39
In an article on Eastern European intelligence reform, Alex Martin has
written:
An outspoken media . . . is a key sign of the success of a social reform
process, and rather than see them as a threat or an obstacle,
intelligence services undergoing reform should harness the new power
of the media to explain why intelligence services are and continue to be
needed. As well as persuading the public of the need for intelligence
services, such a debate, particularly if it gives the public a voice in
designing the intelligence architecture and oversight mechanisms, would
increase the chances that the public felt a degree of ‘ownership’ of the
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services and the structures which governed them, and therefore, that the
intelligence services acted as a guarantor of rather than a threat to their
security.40
Media is the avenue for public access to intelligence organizations, structures,
personnel, reforms, declassified data and materials, policy issues, and policy
implementation. In virtually all new democracies, intelligence agencies
have Websites whereby the public can obtain generic information on
threats, roles, and missions of intelligence, and staffing procedures, as well
as on mechanisms of accountability, transparency, and democratic civilian
control.
Nevertheless, public outreach is a common practice in only a few new
democracies. Of these, notable are Romania’s efforts toward reaching out
to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academia, think tanks, media,
and ultimately to society.41 In Mongolia, too, the General Intelligence
Agency has lately been reaching out to the public via press conferences
and interviews, and its press office, created in 2001, which became a PR
Service in 2008, ‘‘responds to all public inquiries, publicizes activities of the
intelligence services, and provides official positions and explanations’’42
Intelligence official Col. Jargalsaikhan Mendee noted: ‘‘Interestingly, the
number of people who learn about activities of the intelligence services
from the General Intelligence Agency’s Website (www.gia.gov.mn) has
increased significantly: 9.5 percent in 2008 and 12.9 in 2009.’’43 Kenya’s
former intelligence agency, the National Security Intelligence Service
(NSIS), was actively utilizing media to make itself known to Kenyan
citizenry.44 Its Website provided information on NSIS’s regulatory
framework, roles and missions, and capabilities, listed hiring requirements,
and published speeches of the former Director General. In addition, its
successor, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) has been very supportive
of media discussion and debate on intelligence and security issues, a not
very common position in Africa. Further, former intelligence leaders are
contributing to the literature on intelligence in new democracies. For
instance, its former director general, Wilson A. C. Boinett, collaborated
with recognized academics on a volume on ‘‘Changing Intelligence
Dynamics in Africa’’ in 2009. The NSIS thus understood the role of the
media as a bridge between Kenyan citizens and their government, as well
as the media’s role in strengthening intelligence legitimacy and credibility.45
With regard to declassification, opening non-democratic files may
arguably and initially cause more harm to intelligence agencies rather than
helping boost their legitimacy, especially if grave abuses are revealed. But
it may ultimately build up public trust in intelligence, in that the citizens
will appreciate intelligence agencies’ efforts to become more open.
Nevertheless, the declassification of more recent materials, in particular
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those related to operational successes, actually helps increase the agencies’
legitimacy, especially in countries with high security risks. Argentina is
currently undergoing a process of declassification of secret decrees and
secret executive branch administrative decisions, except those jeopardizing
national defense, domestic security, or foreign policy, or those involving
the South Atlantic War (Falklands War) with Great Britain, or any other
interstate conflict.46 In Romania, besides the declassification of thousands
of the former Securitate files since 1999 when the Law on the Access to
the Personal File and the Disclosure of the Securitate as a Political Police
was enacted, the security agencies have declassified information and made
it available to researchers and academics from both Romania and abroad.
During my research visit in 2010 to Romania’s Domestic Intelligence
Service (SRI), the service declassified some information to enable me to do
research on its Anti-Terrorist Brigade.
The Persuasive Capability. An intelligence agency may utilize media outlets
to convince the citizenry that its actions will achieve the policy goals drawn by
the elected officials. The bottom line for any government institution is public
perception of its conduct, capabilities, and performance. Therefore, any
progress toward policy goals, when covered by the media, may boost public
trust and support in intelligence agencies, especially if media as a whole
have high prestige. If the media cover democratic reform of intelligence
positively, they may show citizens that the agencies are trustworthy, and
that they conduct their work according to the legal framework and
mandate imposed upon them by the elected officials. Some Romanian
newspapers actually praise the country’s intelligence community for doing
‘‘its job.’’ As one editor put it: ‘‘I am sure I will irritate many people with
my words, but the truth is that at this moment SRI is one of the most
serious and effective institutions in Romania and proof of successful
reform.’’47 On the same note, the reporting of successful intelligence
operations is an important aspect of the overall legitimating process.48 For
example, frequent news briefings by SRI and=or SIE leaders in Romania
after the Islamist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September
2001 (9=11) and other similar attacks throughout the world, helped inform
the public on national security threats and intelligence capabilities to avert
security threats. Media coverage and reporting on various successful
intelligence counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations and related
political developments—such as the freeing of the journalists kidnapped in
Iraq in 2005, Romania’s contribution to the arrest of international arms
trafficker Viktor Bout in 2008, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
SRI collaborative anti-cyber hacking activities—has incrementally increased
public trust in the nation’s intelligence agencies. A February 2013 poll
revealed that Romanians place the SRI in third place in people’s trust, after
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the Church and the Armed Forces.49 Enhancing confidence in the work of
intelligence agencies is very important, for instance, when hiring new
personnel, striving to secure sufficient resources, and building credibility
with intelligence consumers, especially in new democracies, where
intelligence carries a stigma associated with abuses and violations during
the nondemocratic rule, and people are initially reluctant to join.50
In addition, the inclusion of a wide spectrum of groups, opinions, ideas,
and perspectives in debates on intelligence and national security issues and
policies may result in an improved legitimacy of policy processes.51
Inclusion prompts citizens to champion national security and intelligence,
and favor both transparency and effectiveness of security agencies. The
Mongolian National Intelligence Academy’s Research Center now
organizes conferences and academic sessions. Such inclusion has increased
the intelligence community’s legitimacy with the result that the ‘‘public
emphasizes the autonomy of the intelligence services from politics,
recognizes the increasing role of the intelligence services in national
security affairs, and appreciates the opening of the intelligence services to
public awareness . . . 23.9 percent of the participant responses emphasized
the greater openness of the intelligence services that began in 2008; this
percentage reached 35.6 percent in 2010.’’52 In Romania, the protocol of
cooperation between the SIE and the University of Bucharest, whereby
master of arts (MA) students from the university can participate in an
‘‘OSINT [open source intelligence] internship program’’ ‘‘to acquire
practical experience—which supplements the experience of university
studies—in a field of activity reserved for elite professionals’’ can also
improve the SIE and perhaps the rest of the intelligence community’s (IC)
legitimacy.53
In this context, since even in the new democracies intelligence agencies are
aware of the importance of support from taxpayers as much as from
policymakers, many of those agencies have developed ‘‘pro-active’’ public
relations (PR). At the minimum, PR allows intelligence agencies to ensure
that media is not using sensationalist stories (e.g., focusing on scandals and
failures rather than successes) to distort the IC’s public image, which in a
new democracy is anyway weak. At the maximum, PR may have broader
implications regarding increased public support for policy and security as
well as the agencies’ effectiveness. As Alex Martin has contended:
It is important to put in place a process to demonstrate to the public the
value of the intelligence services, and ways to measure that value.
Intelligence work by its nature is secret, but the public need to be
convinced on an ongoing basis that it needs doing. The people’s
approval should not be taken for granted. Owing to its secretive
nature, this communication with civil society needs to be seen as a key
pillar of intelligence reform.54
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Exercising Informal External Oversight of the Government
A key role performed by the media in a democracy is that of ‘‘informal
external oversight’’ of the government. As Britain’s Lord Macaulay stated
as early as 1832, media is a ‘‘fourth estate’’55 because it complements the
three official branches of government—the executive, legislative, and
judiciary—if or when these are unable or unwilling to fulfill their
responsibilities. In this context, American journalist Peter Eisner noted
that ‘‘journalism . . .has always had a basic obligation—standing up to
power and reporting to the public on the abuse of power, as a sort of
ombudsman.’’56 Or, as Claudia Hillebrand asserted, media has ‘‘an
obligation to keep governments in check and investigate their activities.
This includes the realm of intelligence.’’57 To paraphrase United States
military officer Jon Mordan, who addressed the relationship between the
military and the media in a democracy, essentially, the news media are
suspicious of the intelligence sector. And they should be. Questioning is
the media’s job because intelligence without public scrutiny can lead to
dictatorship.58 And a return to dictatorship is what new democracies
admittedly and hopefully want to avoid.
Under these circumstances, the media’s role of ‘‘informal external oversight’’
involves acting as a ‘‘watchdog’’ that guards against government wrongdoing
and abuse of power, and exposes government transgressions to domestic and
international audiences, thus fostering public scrutiny of government, and
even prompting responsive government. As American scholar Loch K.
Johnson has stated, ‘‘ . . . the virtue of democracy lies not in its ease,’’ but in
its promise to protect the people from the abuse of power—perhaps most
especially secret power.59 Likewise, Marina Caparini argued, the media help
‘‘hold political and state actors accountable by showing their audience what is
actually happening, which may be quite different from what policy-makers,
politicians or diplomats claim to be happening.’’60 The informal oversight
carried out by the media usually occurs through the lens of scandal, such as
the exposure of human rights abuses, misappropriation of funds, or other
such violations which may force the formal control and oversight mechanisms
to do their job more effectively, that is, to start investigations, reprimand
wrongdoing, and change legislation. Media thus sounds ‘‘fire alarms’’61 that
may motivate the official branches of the government to take appropriate
actions. Or, as Loch K. Johnson stated:
A major intelligence scandal or failure—a shock—converts perfunctory
patrolling into a burst of intense firefighting, which is then followed by
a period of dedicated patrolling that yields remedial legislation or other
reforms designed to curb inappropriate intelligence activities in the
future. Sometimes the high-intensity patrolling can last for months
and, if the original shock was particularly strong, producing a media
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tsunami, even years. Once the firestorm has subsided and reforms are in
place, however, lawmakers return to a state of relative inattention to
intelligence issues.62
He then noted, referring to the United States: ‘‘Congress has more authority
to investigate intelligence . . .but . . . the media has more will.’’63 All of this
may have additional positive implications, such as the ‘‘preventive function
of a critical and investigative media,’’ whereby the media may in the future
refrain from abuses and wrongdoing, which further prevents regress to
non-democratic institutions.64 Despite concerns about the objectivity of the
press, the Brazilian media has, since the 1990s, been exposing reform
challenges and failures, as well as abuses and wrongdoing in intelligence.65
For example, in the early 1990s, the Brazilian press was the first to
investigate allegations of corruption and abuse of power against then-
President Fernando Collor; the matter then dubbed by some as the
‘‘Brazilian Watergate,’’ which eventually led to his impeachment by
Congress in 1992.66 Also notable was the exposure by the media of the
Satiagraha Operation, which resulted in hearings of ABIN Directors and
other personnel before the Congress, and the firing of some ABIN
directors.67 In Spain, the Caso Perote, which led to media revelations
about the death squads and illegal wiretapping by CESID, resulted in the
resignations of Socialist Deputy Prime Minister Narcis Serra, Defense
Minister Garcia Vargas, and CESID director Emilio Manglano.68
More recently, also in Spain, the 2009 allegations by El Mundo about
CNI Director Alberto Saiz’s misappropriation of public funds, nepotism,
and other abuses brought about internal (MOD) pressure for Saiz’s
removal, which ultimately led to President Zapatero’s demanding
Saiz’s resignation.69 In Argentina, too, the disclosure by the media
that the Air Force’s intel l igence officers had conducted il legal
surveillance on journalists and NGOs led to the prosecution of responsible
officers.70 But in all these cases the media have only occasionally succeeded
in forcing the various governments’ hand to bring about changes in
intelligence.
A most relevant case, where, despite the government’s sustained deterrence
efforts, and even despite its (natural) proclivity to sensationalism, the media
have been an active watchdog is Romania. By almost constantly exposing, to
both domestic and foreign audiences, scandals, lack of reform, abuses, and
illegal operations, its coverage has led to decreasing the number of
intelligence agencies; boosting the vetting, screening, and firing of the
former Securitate officers, and promoting the recruitment of young
personnel; championing transparency, including access to Securitate files,
and a long-awaited lustration law. The informal oversight Romania’s
media have conducted on intelligence demonstrates that, as Hillebrand put
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it, ‘‘While there is a danger of sensationalism, the media’s oversight process,
by its very nature, is more directed at the wider public.’’71
The Press’s Investigative Function. Part of this function is often referred to
as ‘‘investigative journalism,’’ namely the ceaseless search by a journalist
(or many) of possible wrongdoing, law-breaking, or abuse of power within
government and other public institutions. Yet, this function is somewhat
underdeveloped in the new democracies, especially during the early
transition phase, but not entirely impossible. As recognized experts
regarding DCAF contend: ‘‘Despite many obstacles to media supervision
of intelligence, there are always some reporters who will report to the
public and to parliament, providing more information than the intelligence
services would wish to have disclosed, information which editors will
happily highlight on television or print on their front pages.’’72 After
disclosure by U.S. journalist Dana Priest in 2005 of the CIA’s ‘‘black
sites’’ in several countries in Europe, several journalists from other
countries began looking into these allegations, which subsequently led to
the creation of Committees of Investigations in the legislatures of several
European countries. In Romania, investigative journalism on the presence
of former Securitate in key positions within the government and
intelligence agencies, as well as on the slow process of removing them from
those services, led to substantial vetting reforms. The most relevant
example is the 2002 revelation by a Romanian newspaper of a long list of
Securitate officers occupying key positions within the intelligence services.
At the same time, international, in particular U.S., media coverage on
NATO’s potential unwillingness to share classified information with
former Securitate officers led to Romanian agencies conducting
background checks and granting security clearances to intelligence officials
who were to work with NATO and to more detailed measures for purging
the agencies of former Securitate officers and institutionalizing measures of
protection of classified information.73 In Argentina, too, investigative
journalists exposed illegal wiretapping in the 1990s, which led to criminal
investigations.74
The term ‘‘media’’ thus embodies, as Maria Caparini has put it, an
‘‘ ‘unofficial opposition’ or fallback accountability mechanism: when
internal control does not check questionable behavior, and external control
does not identify and challenge it, the potential exists in a free society for
insider whistle blowing (leaks) or an investigative journalist’s report to
draw attention to it.’’75 But, media, along with other civil society
components, can work directly with formal oversight mechanisms, in
particular members of the executive and committees in the legislatures, to
assist them in setting agendas for security and intelligence meetings,
crafting intelligence-related legislation and policies, and providing a second
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opinion with regard to existing legal framework and policies.76 It can also
assist in developing questions, inquiries, and debates on security and
intelligence-related issues. This aspect is very important in new
democracies, where the tendency, at least at the beginning of transition, is
to formulate security=intelligence policies with little or no formal debate
among the branches of the government and between the government and
the citizens. A study on the media’s role in the new democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe has indicated that the media in these countries
support ‘‘the adoption of democratic norms and play a pronounced
constructive role in political consolidation.’’ And, according to DCAF
expert Antje Fritz, in some Eastern European countries ‘‘the media does
not support political apathy . . .but rather influences the engagement and
involvement of the citizens.’’77 The adoption of the law on the Freedom of
Information (FOIA) was a success of transparency in Romania in two
ways: it granted Romanians access to government records; and it initiated
fruitful cooperation among government, political parties, and the general
public. This was the first time that the public’s representatives had
participated in the lawmaking process from the beginning to the end,
allowing them to provide valuable insight to the law drafters (including
even some international critique on the drafts), and allowed the media to
become more familiar with specific issues pertaining to freedom of
information.78
Providing a ‘‘Learning’’ Environment for Elected Officials and
the Public
Last, and related to the previous three roles, the media constitute a
‘‘learning’’ environment for policymakers, a critical function vis-a`-vis
national security and intelligence issues. In new democracies, and
sometimes in long established ones, civilian policymakers lack either
expertise or interest in intelligence and security issues because these
concerns do not bring in any votes. To be ‘‘effective overseers’’79 elected
officials, particularly lawmakers, need to increase their intelligence and
security awareness, but most importantly, to build into the bureaucratic
culture better incentives to encourage their interest in intelligence and in
performing their duties of assuring intelligence accountability. The media—
along with other civil society actors, such as non-governmental
organizations, academia, and interest groups—can be suitable vehicles
toward these ends. Involving politicians in education and debate on
security issues and policymaking could increase their expertise. While
incentives ‘‘could include prestigious awards presented by the congressional
leadership and civic groups to dedicated and accomplished overseers,
Capitol Hill perks dispensed by the leadership based on the devotion of
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lawmakers to accountability.’’ Claudia Hillebrand noted that ‘‘publicity in
national and hometown newspapers underscoring admirable oversight
achievements by individual members’’ could also stimulate elected officials’
interest and involvement in intelligence and security issues and oversight.80
Specialized journals and magazines, blogs, television talk shows, Internet
Websites, to name a few, provide opportunities for elected officials to
increase their expertise in their field of activity. Further, since official
annual activity or inquiry reports are not always accessible or illuminating
for the public, the media can provide the citizenry with detailed
information, and present it in an easier yet more insightful way.81 The
Romanian press, including newspapers like Ziua, Jurnalul National,
Romania Libera, Adevarul, Curentul, would present yearly reports and
comment about them. Through their public relations offices, intelligence
agencies themselves use media to educate the public about the purpose and
role of intelligence in a democracy, an effort which may increase their
credibility. The media is also the place where both intelligence insiders and
outsiders can contribute to the development of the literature on defense,
security, and intelligence, thereby also playing a part in increasing
policymakers’ and citizens’ expertise and knowledge in intelligence. The
Mongolia National Intelligence Academy’s Research Center, for example,
not only organizes conferences on intelligence and democracy but also
publishes a peer-reviewed academic journal.82 The Romanian intelligence
community likewise utilizes media to increase public and official
knowledge and expertise on intelligence. Of the many journals, books, and
articles written by SRI and DGIA personnel, worth mentioning is the first-
ever article on reform of intelligence analysis in Romania, published in
these pages in 2012 by the SRI’s Mihaela Matei and Ionel Nitu, was
among the earliest studies on this topic in the new democracies.83
CHALLENGES TO THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE REFORM
Several key challenges can constrain the media’s role in intelligence reform.
They include: antithetical cultures; simultaneously similar and different
goals and needs; exclusive or excessive reliance on government sources;
lack of expertise and professionalism; ‘‘deterrence’’ practices employed by
governments toward the media; limited resources; legacies of the past;
corruption and organized crime; and overall democratic regress.
Antithetical Cultures
Intelligence and the media possess almost diametrically opposed institutional
cultures. The media are divided into many competing and self-regulating
subgroups, with virtually no universal professional standards, while
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intelligence agencies are part of the national security ‘‘team,’’84 and generally
have established professional and ethical standards as well routinized
practices.85 In addition, while the media can and often do collectively play
a key role in holding government institutions accountable, its members are
not accountable to anyone.
Simultaneously Similar and Different Goals and Needs
That the two institutions have simultaneously similar and different goals and
needs may have both positive and negative implications for the media’s role
vis-a`-vis intelligence. Both media and intelligence aim and need to collect
news and information, which may entail sympathy, and even mutual
support. But, intelligence agencies, as bureaucracies working in secret, need
and want to control and conceal at least some—perhaps a great deal of—
information from the public in order to remain effective, whereas the
media need and want to uncover, expose, and disseminate information in
order to stay in business. This makes it difficult for the media to exert
their role. Likewise, the media need a ‘‘story’’ and seek to ‘‘sell’’ that story
to the public in order to make a profit, while the intelligence agencies need
to keep to themselves whatever ‘‘story’’ they have so as to be able to
continue working effectively as they seek to support national security by
carrying out roles and missions assigned by elected officials. Under these
circumstances, a mutual lack of trust develops between the media, which
favors transparency, and intelligence agencies which call for secrecy.
The media view of intelligence generally consists of the following:
intelligence agencies are always trying to hide mistakes; intelligence
agencies can and do lie; secrets are always waiting to be discovered;
intelligence agencies need to be accountable and transparent. Intelligence
agencies view the media in this context: intelligence agencies need to be
effective, thus some secrecy is needed; reporters don’t understand the need
for withholding some information; the media can interfere with ongoing
operations; reporters are always digging for dirt; the media sensationalize
stories. For intelligence, then, the media tend to be ‘‘a subversive, rather
than a positive, element.’’86 That perspective makes it difficult for
journalists to access data and information related to intelligence, contact
and communicate with IC professionals, and influence security and
intelligence policies. Yet, despite these challenges, the professionals in each
field consistently attempt to use one another to fulfill their day-to-day
duties.87 Former congressional aide Pat Holt agreed, that the intelligence
sector needs media to tell some of its story, while the media need
intelligence to get an exciting story.88 Thus, intelligence and the media
have a tense but symbiotic relationship, with the ‘‘Liaise’ ’ and
‘‘Watchdog’’ functions providing sufficient examples in this context.
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The tradition of secrecy surrounding intelligence organizations and their
work challenges media efforts to inform the public about government
institutions, policies, and activities. In many new democracies, at least at
the beginning of the transition, a ‘‘culture of secrecy’’ has been inherited
from the old regimes, whereby intelligence agencies tend to classify and
over-classify everything. This was certainly the case in many countries of
Central and Eastern Europe after the transition from Communism. Later
in the process of democratization governments still tend to use ‘‘national
security’’ to limit access to information, even if frameworks for dealing
with the media exist, such as the right to freedom of press, or Freedom of
Information Act-type regulations. That situation develops because many
secrecy laws enacted to ensure the safeguarding of government secret
information (such as Romania’s 2002 Law on Access to Classified
Information), coupled with mechanisms and processes of protection of
classified information (such as Romania’s system of protection of classified
information), prevail over a FOIA. ‘‘Judicial deference’’ may not help if
the courts have difficulty in forcefully defending media independence
against government petitions for upholding national security.89 Bulgaria’s
IC remains heavily surrounded by secrecy and is not at all interested in
winning ‘‘ ‘hearts and minds’ within society.’’90 While freedom of speech
and the media are guaranteed by Spain’s 1977 constitution, no freedom of
information legislation has been enacted despite attempts to do so in 2011,
making it difficult for media to access government data and information,
more so when it comes to intelligence.91 Moreover, Spain has no legal
framework for allowing declassification of intelligence data and
information, which therefore remains a challenge.92 In addition, the
successful terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the U.S., and the
resulting increased worldwide preoccupation with effectively fighting
terrorism, have effectively prompted new democracies to constrain freedom
of expression and access to government information, as well as limiting
public scrutiny of the intelligence organizations and their work. As Antje
Fritz has noted: ‘‘It has become considerably easier for intelligence services
to control the media than for the media to make intelligence-related issues
transparent to the public. At the same time, the media has been weakened
in its ability to gain access to information and, in some cases, is obliged to
hold back information.’’93
Limiting access to information is understandable in terms of fulfilling
policy objectives, protection of sources or methods, and=or safeguarding
the national and public interest. But the reverse is true when it occurs for
personal or political reasons, or to conceal information that may result in
the embarrassment of government institutions or public figures. For
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example, not disclosing the names of intelligence operatives abroad during
the Cold War may have been acceptable; but to subsequently classify as
top secret information that protects politicians who were informants
during that era, or classifying information in order to cover up corruption,
incompetence, abuse, and even criminal activities is not acceptable. Even
intelligence agencies that are institutionalizing PR and support reporting
on success stories remain concerned with endangering sources, methods or
operations. My discussion with Romanian intelligence professionals in
2010 revealed that, while they are grateful when the media cover positively
the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and prefer to be not
mentioned, they nevertheless understand the idea and benefit of public
relations.94 Under these circumstances, secrecy has some broader negative
implications on the relationship between the government’s intelligence
agencies and the citizenry, which, in a new democracy, remains brittle due
to the abusive past. That lingering odium and rejection tend to trump
public support for intelligence and delay the development of intelligence
and security culture.
Another challenge for the media related to secrecy is how to deal with
classified information when received—whether to publish or not—
especially when the new democracies may lack legislation in this context.
Pat Holt noted that the general rule of publishing the information seems to
prevail unless the intelligence agencies provide a credible argument that its
dissemination will seriously harm the nation’s security.95 Surprisingly,
however, even in new democracies, the media may voluntarily withhold
information that may jeopardize the national, and even international,
security. In Romania, in 2006, when the media got hold of a computer disc
with classified information which belonged to the Military Intelligence
Directorate, they refrained from publishing it because it contained data on
Romania’s and the international coalition’s efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Exclusive or Excessive Reliance on Government Sources
The media can be easily compromised by its association with the political
class and intelligence agencies. Journalists covering intelligence and security
issues, which are otherwise hard to access due to secrecy, depend
significantly on information provided by intelligence agencies and other
government institutions. Nevertheless, exclusive reliance on official
government sources begets an ‘‘adulteration’’ of media coverage, which has
negative consequences.96 In essence, the media become the government’s
‘‘voice’’ rather than its ‘‘vehicle of communication.’’ The views of
government on a particular issue or policy are thereby conveyed without
being able to ensure the proper verification of information, or perhaps
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without seeking or offering alternative views or critiques. Next, the media
may self-censor, in that they deliberately refrain from covering issues and
policies that are not formally brought up or, if alleged by opposition or
international media, confirmed by the government. For example, while the
international media and human rights groups were very vocal about the
existence of ‘‘black sites’’ in Romania and other European countries, and
called for thorough investigations of any human rights violations, the
Romanian media seemed to be less aggressive vis-a`-vis the concern about
secret prisons. In Spain, newspapers ‘‘receive large government subsidies,
which encourages self-censorship.’’97 For instance, in Catalonia, the
Catalan government funds some newspapers and public radio and
television networks, and these media outlets ‘‘are highly reluctant to root
out and reveal wrongdoing’’ within the government.98 Further, the
Catalonian media, willingly or not, favors ‘‘spin,’’ namely, the carefully
fabricated and controlled formal statements that represent the perspective
or opinion of the government or a particular member of the government
on a specific issue. Spain’s two big political parties—Partido Socialista
Obrero Espanol (PSOE) and Partido Popular (PP)—ban public or private
television crews’ access to their executive meetings and to the big campaign
meetings; they themselves produce the audiovisual material to be
distributed to the media afterwards.99 Obviously, spin is accepted. As
Pedro Gonzalez commented ‘‘These unreasonable restrictions spell a sad
decline in the practice of independent journalism.’’100 Finally, the media
may curry a favor to a politician or intelligence professional by either
covering, or refraining from covering, a specific issue that gives preference
to, or does a disservice to, certain members of government. Spain’s highly
politicized media is an exemplar here.101
This reflects media’s concern that any criticism of government actions or
inactions, developments, or policies of may endanger its access to the
official source, and affect the media’s capability to properly inform citizens
as well as to perform informal oversight of intelligence. In addition, the
presence of undercover intelligence personnel in the media business—a
frequent practice in new democracies—which might influence reporting on
issues favorable to the IC, also challenges media’s role in the democratic
control of intelligence. Furthermore, the creation of vast business
conglomerates, which often include media firms, can elicit tight
government or corporate control of media ownership, diminish variety in
media coverage and opinions, link corporate interests to the media, and
bolster politicization of the media.102 As Spain’s Pedro Gonzalez has
observed:
The existence of multimedia groups is a big temptation for politicians and
for enterprises. They know that if a plausible report is fed to the radio
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station of any media group, then the TV station and the newspapers of
the same news corporation will follow, spreading the story rapidly.
And [they] may comment in such a way as to pass on the report as
true, even when it is a fiction. So false or partially false news can
become established as real in the minds of listeners, viewers or readers,
and it can become impossible to refute it.103
In Spain, ‘‘the concentration of the media in a handful of large holding
groups, and the self-imposed censorship or slanting of coverage in the
major media, favoring certain business interests or political parties’’ is of
great concern.104
Lack of Expertise and Professionalism
A lack of expertise and ability among journalists to engage with issues related
to intelligence challenges the media’s role in intelligence reform as well. In new
democracies, the lack of professionalism in journalism, coupled with lack of
expertise in intelligence, negatively impacts the media’s capacity to inform,
frame discussions and debates, contribute to the development of an
intelligence and security culture, and conduct effective informal oversight,
but more importantly, may jeopardize sources and methods or ongoing
operations. Instead, it can lead to sensationalism for profit versus
objectivity for national security. For example, the tendency for
inexperienced journalists in new democracies is, at least at the dawn of
transition, to publish stories without conducting any prior verification,
which, unfortunately, often turn out to be false. That becomes possible
because of an unclear or non-existent legal basis for media. In Spain, Pedro
Gonzalez reports, ‘‘unsubstantiated rumor has largely taken the place of
genuine news in the information accessed by the internet-using public.’’ As
a result, ‘‘PR and press departments . . .have to work hard to dispel such
rumors and gossip. The advent of 24-hour news has led to further problems
for the media and their ability to retain trust.’’105 In Poland, between
1989–1997, at its worst, noted Frances Millard, the press undermined
‘‘democratic ideals by preaching intolerance and conformity, attacking or
supporting government regardless of merit’’; it was ‘‘tendentious, intolerant,
parochial, ill-informed and distasteful.’’106 This situation is even more
damaging when dealing with national security issues and implications.
Equally challenging for the media’s input to intelligence reform,
particularly in its role of watchdog, are (1) ‘‘opinion journalism,’’ whereby
journalists provide their personal opinions, sometimes highly biased and
speculative, on a specific issue rather than reporting the facts; and=or (2)
‘‘tabloid journalism,’’ whereby journalists focus on and emphasize
sensational topics such as gossip and defamatory columns or coverage
about the personal lives of intelligence and other government officials.
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Profit-making prevails over providing quality products to serve citizens’
interest. Cases of sensationalism and tabloidism of media are plentiful
throughout the world. In addition, while advances in technology may
increase the availability of information to the media independent of
government control, the media’s dependence on the intelligence services for
‘‘sellable material’’ may increase.107
Government’s ‘‘Deterrence’’ Practices
When media coverage in new democracies tends to show governments and
intelligence agencies in a poor light, the regimes attempt to manipulate or
discourage the media from continuing to do so. For example, in Romania,
the SRI’s first Director, Virgil Magureanu, tried to close a newspaper
unfavorable to the government in order to stop its investigative coverage.
Also, former Defense Minister Ioan Mircea Pascu tried to intimidate an
investigative journalist, threatening that he was aware of ‘‘all he (the
journalist) is doing, where he is going, what and with whom he is talking,’’
thus implying that the journalist was under surveillance by the intelligence
directorate within the Ministry of Defense.108 In Spain, according to a
Freedom House report of 2011, a ‘‘disturbing trend of violence and threats
against journalists’’ had begun, including one against journalist Gorka
Ramos, who was beaten, arrested, and indicted for disobeying authorities
while covering anticorruption protests in front of the Ministry of
Interior.109 Thus, according to Richard Schweid, Spain’s journalists find it
cumbersome ‘‘to do serious government reporting without the benefit of
hard facts. . . .Currently, public officials are under no legal obligation to
open their books, reports, or statistics to inspection, and requests for them
to do so, whether from citizens or journalists, are routinely denied or
ignored. Reports prepared with public funds on everything from day-care
inspections to crime statistics are available only for those who can prove a
‘need to know,’ and a direct relationship to the information.’’110 The role
of security institutions in safeguarding national security involves a mutual
trust between government and the public they are supposed to serve. Civil
society and the media may help preserve that trust intact, but if
governments ignore the media, or make negative assumptions about it, the
trust may vanish. Governments should remember that the media have
‘‘tremendous capacity to influence people, and an organization’s
involvement with the media, will in turn, influence people.’’111
Limited Resources
Investigative journalism is expensive and time consuming. Reliance on public
funding—which may fuel cheerleading and eye-closing by the media toward
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intelligence agencies and government policies, and similarly on private funding
(which may fuel constraints on the media by corporate leadership)—is equally
challenging for the media’s unbiased role in intelligence reform. The Spanish
examples are relevant to this point. As Marina Caparini noted,
Ongoing coverage of intelligence-related issues—which is more likely to
provide scrutiny and accountability than event-driven coverage—is
unlikely except in states with large intelligence apparatuses, as in the
US, or states having a recent history of repressive intelligence agencies
and deep societal interest in the subject, as is the case in Romania.112
Legacy of the Past
Media in states that are transitioning from nondemocratic regimes to
democracy face additional challenges. In some cases, such as transitions
from sultanistic or totalitarian regimes which lack pluralism, meaning a
parallel society and underground opposition and media (including a
samizdat), civil society and the media need to be created from scratch.113 In
Romania, for example, civil society was essentially born at the beginning of
the transition from the Ceauc¸escu regime, in the University Square of
Bucharest, where a small group of students protested against a new
government that opted for ‘‘Communism with human face’’ as opposed to
democracy. They were joined by representatives of newly-created NGOs,
private associations, labor union members, intellectuals, artists, and the
media.114 But even when important institutional changes in the media occur,
such as the creation of a legal framework for free and pluralistic media,
private and public-owned television and radio stations, local and nationwide
newspapers and magazines, blogs and the like, the challenge remains of
developing a ‘‘professional’’ media. During the nondemocratic regime the
journalists served the ruling clique; journalism meant ‘‘lying’’ and the
fabrication of facts to support and serve the regime. This practice tends to
continue, at least during the initial phase of transition. Likewise, at the
beginning of regime change, the press tends to be either aggressive and
indiscriminate, opting for sensationalism rather than serving the public
interest, or it may continue the old practices of self-censorship, or do both.
With regard to the intelligence sector, the lack of public support for
intelligence due to abuses during the nondemocratic past, in parallel with a
nonexistent intelligence culture among intelligence outsiders, may be present.
Also manifest may be a lack of understanding as to why democracies need
to institutionalize (hopefully, effective) intelligence agencies, or why the need
for some secrecy is involved in intelligence work, as well as why democratic
control mechanisms should exist and what should be involved. These issues
tend to ‘‘deter’’ the media from providing unbiased coverage on intelligence,
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let alone encouraging an intelligence and security debate, at least during the
first years of transition. Instead, they tend to ‘‘prompt’’ the press to discredit
intelligence. In addition, an enduring intolerance among government
institutions towards the media in general, and investigative journalism in
particular, as well as cooptation, abuse, and coercion of journalists by
elected officials—hangovers of the nondemocratic past—also challenge the
media, especially investigative function. As the current SRI Director, George
Maior, has noted, the legacy of the past has had ‘‘direct effects on the ways
leaders . . .defined and supported the restructuring of their secret services, as
well as on the relationships between intelligence producers and consumers
and between the intelligence agencies and public opinion.’’115
The key institutional change to overcoming this obstacle is for journalists to
take on a new role: professionally utilizing their personal judgment and analysis.
In Romania, in the immediate aftermath of the Communist collapse, the press
was aggressive and indiscriminate, opting for sensationalism rather than
serving the public interest. For instance, the media reported alleged links
between Radu Timofte and the Soviet KGB immediately before the 2000
elections when he was proposed for SRI director, demanding his withdrawal
from consideration for that position. But, as it turned out, not only had
Timofte not been involved with the KGB, but his career in the military was
terminated by the SRI’s predecessor, the Securitate, in the 1980s because his
sister had emigrated to the United States.116
Things have changed somewhat in the more than two decades of
democratization. Legislation protecting both the media and individuals has
been passed, and laws now regulate journalistic ethics, free access to
information, audio-visuals, slander, and libel. Departments teaching media,
communications, journalism, and public relations have been created in
almost all Romanian universities to ensure professional and academic
training, and the use of foreign expertise has opened doors for the country’s
journalists. The press has become increasingly more professional, ethical,
and spirited. Nevertheless, as everywhere, the Romanian media remains a
profit-oriented business and sensationalistic coverage will always happen.
Corruption and Organized Crime
In emerging democracies, corruption and organized crime are fueled by the
frail legitimacy of the political class and fragile state institutions; free
movement policies; poverty and inequality; increased insecurity due to
conflicts, criminal activities, or terrorism in neighboring areas; as well as
increased opportunities for enrichment through illegal avenues. Criminal
groups are wealthy enough to corrupt state institutions (for example, by
buying immunity from prosecution), or, worse, to directly penetrate them
(including the intelligence agencies), let alone through their impact on the
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media. Corruption in the media clearly affects its capacity to remain unbiased
and free.
Overall Democratic Regress
If transition states cannot, or deliberately refuse to, provide basic human
rights, freedoms, and liberties for their citizens, ensure political freedom,
plura l i sm, and compet i t ion, establ i sh free market economies ,
institutionalize democratic civilian democratic control and oversight of the
security sector, and, most importantly, foster the development of vigorous
civil societies and free media, they, almost by definition, fail to
democratize.117 As these countries remain moderately or strongly
authoritarian, intelligence agencies are more likely to remain unreformed
and non-democratic. In Russia, for example, the media are controlled by
President Vladimir Putin, who is supported by the intelligence services.
These circumstances do not promote investigative journalism, real
intelligence and security debate, or encourage learning about intelligence.
The media thus face various obstacles and challenges in reporting on
security and intelligence–related issues and performing informal external
oversight of the government. Overcoming these obstacles involves bringing
about and maintaining a ‘‘workable’’ media–government relationship that
includes: a robust legal framework to regulate the media, protect freedom
of speech and information, and ensure transparency; support for freedom
of the media and investigative journalism throughout all strata of society,
including government; and, a continuous striving to institutionalize a
professional media that is capable of distancing itself from the government
and ensuring unbiased coverage.118 As Antje Fritz has noted:
The media and intelligence services need each other in order to achieve
effective security policy on the one hand and democratic legitimisation
on the other hand. This is why filters, including selfregulations have
some sort of justification, while at the same time it is of crucial
importance that journalists do not stop observing and monitoring their
states and societies carefully.119
MEDIA’S IMPACT ON CONTROL VERSUS EFFECTIVENESS120
Media’s contribution to democratic reform of intelligence faces several
challenges associated with the two institutions’ goals, roles, and views.
Government’s reliance on secrecy, a lack of media professionalism, the
reliance on official sources, as well as corruption, organized crime, and
overall democratic regress are factors affecting the relationship. Despite
these challenges, and whether sensationalist or not, the media in new
democracies can play an informal, yet more or less nonlinear, role in
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democratization of intelligence. They inform the citizens with regard to
intelligence issues and changes, foster debates on such topics, knit more
closely the citizenry and government, informally monitor intelligence
agencies and help legitimize them, and contribute to the development of an
intelligence culture in new democracies.
Influence on the Requirements for Control
In new democracies, the media relevantly influence the control dimension of
democratic reform of intelligence. Of the three requirements for ‘‘control,’’
the media collectively seem to have the highest influence on ‘‘control’’ and
‘‘oversight.’’ With regard to ‘‘control,’’ in some new democracies, media
coverage, debates, and analyses and media’s direct involvement with the
government agencies in developing democratic institutions have had a
certain say in the development of intelligence and security-related legal
frameworks. They have also influenced institutions, including civilian-led
agencies, as they seek to achieve agency accountability and transparency and
effectiveness. With regard to ‘‘oversight,’’ in many new democracies
reporting, debates, leaks, and ‘‘fire alarms’’ sounded by either sensationalist
or investigative media on wrongdoing, abuses, corruption, and lack of
reform, have forced the formal control=oversight bodies to bring about such
changes as legal measures by the Executive, inquiries in the Legislature, and
investigations by Judicial Courts, which have led to more democratic
legislation, organization, structures, human resources, and roles and missions
for the intelligence agencies. In addition, media’s role in educating the public
and policymakers on matters pertaining to intelligence has contributed to
increasing the awareness of formal oversight bodies’ about the need for
intelligence in a democracy, as well the value of expertise in performing their
duties effectively, both of which have led to improved oversight. With regard
to ‘‘professional norms,’’ investigative journalism, media warnings about
ethical issues, illegalities, and abuses, have prompted intelligence managers
to bring about changes in expertise, responsibility, and corporateness of their
agencies. Nevertheless, the media have not always swayed policy.
All in all, as Professor Harry Howe Ransom put it, ‘‘[t]he press, with all of
its problems, remains the chief accountability enforcer.’’121 Thus, while it
obviously has a great role in, and makes a significant contribution to, the
control and oversight of intelligence, the question remains: Can media
contribute to intelligence effectiveness?
Influence on Requirements for Effectiveness
Although seemingly counterintuitive, relatively free media in new
democracies may indirectly influence the effectiveness of intelligence,
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though certainly not as much as it positively impacts democratic civilian
control. Of the three requirements for effectiveness, the media have the
most influence on ‘‘plans’’ and ‘‘institutions.’’ With regard to ‘‘plans,’’ in
some new democracies, debates on strategic documents have taken place
between the government and the public in the media, and some
governments have taken these debates into account, among them
Romania, Chile, South Africa. With regard to ‘‘institutions,’’ media
debates on threats and the need for capable security institutions may have
improved the knowledge and education of leaders within the executive
branch, enabling them to ‘‘invest’’ in security and intelligence, and draw
up policies and strategies.
All in all, the media’s impact on plans and institutions has led to an
improved intelligence cycle: Policymakers’ increased expertise has resulted in
better requirements and guidance, notably in Romania, and hopefully better
policies. With regard to ‘‘resources’’ however, the media’s influence has been
minimal and perhaps damaging: while media may have contributed to the
debate—especially through public relations events—on why democracies
need effective intelligence, and may have educated civilian elites on the need
to provide sufficient resources to agencies in order for them to do their jobs
effectively, in many situations the media have actually called for budget
cuts, which are often detrimental to intelligence effectiveness.
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